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What is being? This was and still is one of the fundamental questions within 
the area of metaphysics. The researcher in this piece studies the dynamics of 
the problem of being in metaphysics. A historical approach is adopted to this 
study. The researcher goes through the Ancient, Medieval, Modern and 
Contemporary Periods to understand the development of the concept of 
being. The researcher also explores the understanding of the concept of 
being by African thinkers. In this regard, Emmanuel Edeh‟s development of 
Igbo concept of being, Pantaleon‟s philosophy of belongingness as being, 
based on Igbo ontology, and the use of Chi to designate the notion of being in 
Igbo metaphysics by some African philosophers is also explored. Not 
minding the developments of the concept of being by various philosophers, 
the researcher discovers that the original concept of being as that which 
exists is retained. 
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Introduction 
The question, ‗what is being?‘ is one of the fundamental enquiries within the 
parameters of metaphysics. This becomes very important since metaphysics 
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as a branch of philosophy is concerned with the totality of being in its nature 
and structure. And since metaphysical problems are perennial ones, which 
cannot be obviously solved dogmatically, it is not surprising that the question 
of the nature of being has been there right from the period men and women 
began to philosophize to the present time. In this piece, the researcher is 
burdened with the understanding of the problem of being in the historical 
development of metaphysics. This would lead through the Ancient to the 
Medieval, Modern, Contemporary Epochs, without leaving out the concept of 
being by contemporary African philosophers.  
Being in the ancient era 
This enquiry about the nature of being was first set in an articulated motion 
by Parmenides when he argued that whatever is, is being. He further said that 
being is one, eternal and unchanging, meaning that whatever changes is not 
being (Omoregbe, 2002). This notwithstanding, Heraclitus of Ephesus was 
chiefly famous in antiquity for his doctrine that everything is in a state of 
flux, as such, being is characterised by flux (Russell, 1975). Plato, while 
disagreeing with Heraclitus on his doctrine of flux, agrees with Parmenides 
that reality is eternal and unchanging, however differs from Parmenides in 
arguing that being is multiple rather than one; and these are the forms in the 
Platonic World of Forms. The ultimate source of all the Forms, for Plato is 
the Form of Good. It is the source of the being of other Forms. Aristotle who 
defines Metaphysics as the study of ‗being qua being‘ identifies being with 
God; it is therefore not surprising that in Aristotle, Metaphysics becomes 
theology (Omoregbe, 2002). He defines being as the foundation and unity of 
all things. His definition of being leads to identification of being with God. 
This was a view that Aquinas would adopt in the Medieval Ages, and which 
Dons Scotus and William of Ockham would oppose.  
Being in the medieval epoch 
The emergence of the Medieval Epoch did not alter the centrepiece of 
metaphysical enquiry (Onyeocha, 2009). St Thomas Aquinas followed 
Aristotle in identifying being with God. For Aquinas, God is being while 
other creatures are beings in an analogical sense. Contrary to Aristotle who 
defined being as the foundation and unity of all things, Dun Scotus opines 
that being is indefinable, this is because it is the simplest and all embracing 
of all the concepts. Reacting to Aquinas, Duns Scotus rejected and proposed 
that creatures are beings in the real sense of the word and not in an analogical 
sense as Aquinas had taught (Omoregbe, 2002). As such, infinite beings are 
beings in the same way as finite beings are. As such, for him, being is 
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univocal and not analogical. With this argument, he destroys the ground for 
attributing ‗beingness‘ solely to God. This was a view that William of 
Ockham, another eminent medieval philosopher agreed to. From the 
foregoing, if we define being as ‗that which is‘, it is reasonable to say that 
Duns Scotus and William of Ockham are correct in saying that being is a 
univocal concept.  
Being in the modern and contemporary periods 
During the Modern and Contemporary Periods, the problem of being did not 
feature prominently as philosophers were more concerned with the problem 
of substance. The problem however emerged in Hegel. He understands being 
as something in a dialectical process. He contrasted being with non-being, as 
thesis and antithesis respectively. The dialectical encounter between the 
thesis and antithesis is a synthesis, which is a process of becoming. Thus in 
Hegel, to be is to be in a process of becoming. Martin Heidegger was hugely 
interested in the concept of being. Being for Heidegger is not a particular 
being, as Aristotle and Aquinas have identified with God. For instance, you 
can‘t call a chair or a man a being. Being goes beyond particular things, it is 
rather the ground of all beings and the source from which all beings derive 
their being. Jean-Paul, as an existentialist defined being from this 
perspective: being is whatever is, not something hidden or mystical. He 
objects to any understanding of being from the perspective of derivation, 
participation or creation, this is because no reason can be given for its 
existence. He goes further to argue that the foundation of being is 
nothingness, for it emerged from nothing. In Jean-Paul, the religious concept 
of being found in Aristotle and Aquinas is discarded pointing to the natural 
and atheistic approaches that would dominate the Modern and Contemporary 
Eras.  For Gabriel Marcel, a Catholic existentialist, being is a mystery and 
not a problem: a mystery in which we are all engulfed since we are all beings 
(Omoregbe, 2002). From all these definitions through the different ages of 
the development of philosophy, whether being is conceived as God or a 
mystery or a process, being still remains that which is. 
Being in African metaphysics 
African philosophers like their Western counterparts have also tried to 
understand being in such a way that it corresponds to the African spirit. In 
this area, the researcher would discuss the concepts of being in Emmanuel 
Edeh, Pantaleon Iroegbu, and the proposal of Chi as an African concept for 
being.  
The Problem of Being in Metaphysics 
Copyright © IAARR 2012: www.afrrevjo.net 116 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
Edeh’s presentation of Igbo philosophy of being 
Edeh‘s presentation of the concept of being in Igbo metaphysics, as one 
would expect was derived from Igbo ontology. He posits a notion of being 
that is derived from dual loci: from the Igbo language and the Igbo concept 
of the human person (Pantaleon, 1995). As regards the derivation of the Igbo 
concept of being from the concept of the human person, Edeh says that it is 
born from the fact that human beings are the principal focus of the Igbo 
physical world, basically comprising the human and non-human. This is 
expressed in Igbo names and proverbs: madu-ka (Human beings are the 
greatest) madu-bisi (Human life is the first) (Edeh, 1985). From the 
foregoing, one becomes aware of what is through an awareness of the human 
person as a visible concrete instance of what exists. But this would not be the 
area of concern in this piece. The researcher is primarily concerned with the 
derivation of being from the Igbo language. 
From the Igbo language 
Edeh‘s presentation of being in Igbo metaphysics reveals a deep search by a 
pioneer African thinker of an African concept that would equal the concept of 
being employed by his Western contemporaries. And since the Igbo language 
has no exact equivalence of being in English as he argues ―The Igbo 
language has no word that exactly translates the English word‖ (Edeh 1985, 
p.93), he draws out two hypotheses that approximate this notion: the onye 
and ife hypothesis.   
The ‘onye’ hypothesis 
Edeh employs the concept of onye in Igbo language to test-denote the 
concept of being. But he discovers that onye hypothesis is basically 
applicable to human beings only. What then becomes of non-human 
existence that cannot be described as onye? The concept of onye has three 
applications: 
1. Onye as a pronominal clause: as a pronominal clause it means 
‗who‘, as in ―Jonathan who is the president of Nigeria‖ (Jonathan 
Onye bu president Nigeria).  
2. Onye as an interrogative adjective: as an interrogative adjective, 
Onye is used to introduce interrogative statements. ‗Onye?‟  For 
instance, if someone knocks at your door, you can ask, onye? That is 
‗who?‘ Then the person responds, obu Kanu (It is Kanu). One can 
also speak of ‗onye ma echi?‘ (who knows tomorrow?)  
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3. Onye as a noun: ‗In this category, its nearest but not exact English 
equivalent is person‘. Onye in this sense refers to all living entities, 
both human and superhuman. However, each time it is employed, it 
is always precedes an adjective or another noun.  For example, onye 
okike (creator), onye uko (Intermediary), onye nzuzu (fool), onye 
mmuta (scholar).  
Although most of his informants prefer the use of onye to speak of being in 
Igbo language, especially since it conveys the idea of human beings and 
designates spiritual beings, Edeh realizes that it cannot be employed to 
adequately designate the Igbo notion of being. This is based on the principal 
defect that onye cannot include inanimate objects, vegetation or nonhuman 
animate entities. Things like stone, wood, house, book, pen etc cannot be 
referred to as onye. If for instance a piece of stone falls on my roof or a 
vulture lands on my roof, I cannot use onye to make enquiries. The 
limitedness of the onye hypothesis makes Edeh to seek an alternative concept 
for the designation of being in Igbo ontology (Edeh, 1985). 
From ‘onye’ to ‘ife’ hypothesis 
Having understood the limitations of onye, Edeh in his indefatigable spirit 
moves on to make further investigations on a more appropriate concept for 
being. In his investigation, he arrives at ife. According to Edeh, ―the Igbo 
word ife primarily means thing, anything material of immaterial. It is used to 
refer to a happening, an event, an occurrence. Ife can also be affixed to any 
adjective to mean specific things‖ (Edeh 1985, p.95).  For instance, ife obuna 
(anything), ife ebube (thing of wonder), ife ojoo (bad thing), ife oma (good 
thing). After a wide and profound investigation, Edeh realizes that there is no 
word in Igbo language outside ife that approximates the Igbo concept of 
being (Igbo notion of being covers all categories of being).  
And thus, he subscribes to the ife hypothesis for the following metaphysical 
reasons: the Igbo notion of being embraces all categories of being. The onye 
hypothesis on the one hand, already fails in covering all dimensions of being 
since it only concerns human and spiritual beings, leaving out inanimate, 
vegetative and non-human animate beings. Ife on the other hand, although it 
primarily refers to inanimate things, by expansion can include human and 
suprahuman beings (Edeh, 1985). For instance, Edeh says that if an elder 
asks the question: kedu ife kelu madu? (what thing created human beings), 
any person conversant with the language knows that ife in this context refers 
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to Chineke, the Igbo name for the highest of the suprasensible being, the 
unmade maker of all things. 
From ‘ife’ to ‘ife-di’ 
Having arrived at the ife hypothesis, Edeh realised that ife as a concept does 
not bring out all that being means.  
However, we must note that ife does not bring out 
completely all that being means. Ife does not 
emphasize the important aspect of being, namely, the 
fact of existence. Ife standing on its own can be used 
to refer to both existent and non-existent entities. 
Hence we have to search for a way of using ife to 
highlight the fact of existence and exclude the 
possibility of nonexistence(Edeh 1985,p. 96). 
To find a solution to this problem, Edeh combines ife and idi to get ife-idi. 
Idi is the Igbo verb to be. It can be used as an adjective and can also be 
suffixed to anything to show that it exists. For example, okwute di (the stone 
that exists), Nkita di (the dog that exists), Kanu di (Kanu who exists). Edeh 
does not end here, he goes further to bring out the categories of ife-di that 
corresponds to different kinds of being. 
1. The suprasensory category: in the suprasensory category are beings 
like Chineke and Ndi muo (spirits).  
2. The human category: the human category is subdivided into Ndi din 
du (the living) and Ndi Nwuru (the dead).  
3. The thing category: the thing category is divided into three major 
groupings: anu (which means animals), ife nkiti (this covers all 
inanimate entities), and ogu (beings that have no existence of their 
own). 
With this understanding of being by Edeh, the researcher would evaluate it in 
relation to the positions of some other African philosophers who have 
proposed other concepts for being in Igbo traditional thought. 
Pantaleon’s presentation of an African concept of being 
Pantaleon (1995, p.374) defines belongingness as ‗the synthesis of the reality 
and experience of belongingness‘. In this case, the recipient-subject of 
belonging is involved: something belongs and it belongs to something. 
Belongingness is a special noun from the verb ‗to belong‘. It means to be part 
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of, or to be a member of a group. For Instance, I belong to Arondizuogu 
community, this gives me rights and privileges that others who do not belong 
to this community do not have. There is also a possessive nuance of the verb 
‗to belong‘. I can say that the soap belongs to me. In the first nuance, to 
belong creates a situation of participation and in the second, it creates a 
situation of possession. There is an ontological nuance of belongingness, 
which specifies that a thing is because it belongs. To be is to belong and to 
belong is to be (Anah, 2005).  
The Igbo principle of Egbe bere Ugo bere (let the kite perch, let the eagle 
perch) re-enacts the contents and significance of belongingness as the essence 
and hermeneatic core of reality (Pantaleon, 1995). Pantaleon believes that 
what a being is, is its activity of perching (belonging). To perch is to be. To 
be is to perch. To be is to belong and to belong is to be. When Egbe perches 
and Ugo perches, they come face to face with each other. They are with each 
other. They are present to each other. They relate to each other deeply and 
directly as well as have relationships with other inhabitants of Uwa (world). 
To relate is to share something: to give and take. They have common 
projects, needs and desires. Together they struggle to overcome their 
difficulties and share their joy (Pantaleon, 1995).  
Obviously, the idea of ‗To be is to belong and to belong is to be‘ may sound 
tautological, but it is the definitional circle involved in any description of 
being as being. This circle will however be clarified as the four Pantaleonine 
analytic connotations of belongingness is explored.  
Be-(I)-on (Be on) 
In this case, ‗to belong‘ involves ‗being on‘ in the Uwa (Uwa is the world in 
English, but in Igbo it takes up a meaningful depth. It is the entirety of 
existence) from which all concrete realities derive their being. To be on in 
this sense is to escape the contrary of being off. For either one is on or he is 
off (Pantaleon, 1995).  To be off is to cease to exist and to be on is to be.   
Be- (l)-on-going 
Having been given existence in the Uwa, this aspect of belongingness speaks 
of the being now going on in its Uwa and Uwaness (Pantaleon, 1995). In this 
case, Pantaleon suggests that Uwa is the underlying principle in Igbo 
Metaphysics. This particularly speaks of the process of being, for to remain 
in being is to proceed in being and not out of being. In this process of being, 
Pantaleon (1995) makes a difficult synthesis of change and permanence. As 
the being goes on in being, it maintains its identity even though something in 
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it changes. In ancient philosophy, change and permanence was a bone of 
contention between Heraclitus and Parmenides, but in Igbo Metaphysics it is 
no problem at all. For uwa naeme ntughari (the world changes), even though, 
in the midst of the change Uwa bu otu (the world does not change). 
Be-long 
To be-long for Pantaleon (1995) means to abide, to stay or live long. In this 
case, it means that belongingness lives long. As such, the subject of Uwa 
lives long. This brings in the issue of space and time, for belongingness is 
expressed in space and time. Be-long extends into eternity in Igbo ontology; 
it goes beyond the present dimension of the Uwa to the Uwa of the ancestors, 
such that to be and not to be-long is not to be at all. While on-going 
belongingness may be open-ended, being-long belongingness stretches into 
everlastingness. As such, in Pantaleon, one becomes through being-on so as 
to be-going, in other to be-long. 
Be-longing 
This speaks of being and longing to be. It stresses the longing for life and 
being. It is founded on the awareness that nothing is higher a value than life. 
Expressions in Igbo bring this home: nduka (life is greater); Ndubuisi (life is 
the principal thing). To long for life is to want to be, not in the abstract Uwa 
but in the concreteness of what Uwa offers.  
Each of these themes of belongingness addresses the significance of being, 
and thus summarizes the essence of being as belongingness. From these 
analytic themes, we also come to learn that once one is tuned in being; there 
is no going back from its beingness. One continually goes on in being and not 
even death can stop one‘s ongoingness of being (Pantaleon, 1995). 
Chi as designating the notion of being in Igbo metaphysics 
Njoku (2010), Okere (1983) and Abanuka (2003) have proposed chi as an 
alternative concept for being. Njoku went further to criticize Edeh‘s concept 
of being and proposes Chi as a replacement for Edeh‘s ife. If the purpose is to 
address the limitations ife, it does not seem to work. The idea of chi has 
created more problems than it set out to address. Njoku‘s argument is that chi 
is preferable because everything in Igbo, whether animate or inanimate has a 
chi. Njoku forgets here that what we are looking for in Igbo metaphysics is 
not a name for a thing that is contained in everything in the Igbo world. Chi 
would better serve as an underlying principle in Igbo metaphysics than as a 
name for being in Igbo. The idea of chi takes us back to the arguments of the 
Ionian Philosophers who speak of water and air and fire as the underlying 
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principle in every reality. There isn‘t enough ground to conclude from here 
that reality is water or air or fire. It is difficult to conclude that because a 
thing, say ‗A‘, possesses another thing inside of itself, say ‗B‘, that ‗B‘ is now 
‗A‘. For instance, as human being possess blood in their veins, it is not a 
sufficient reason to conclude that because every human being has blood 
therefore every human being can be called blood. Chi cannot stand as a 
concept for being. That ‗all things possess Chi‘ does not easily translate into 
‗all things can be called chi‘.  
Conclusion 
The above study about the problem of being in metaphysics has led us 
through the different ages of the development of metaphysics, revealing the 
character of metaphysical problems as a perennial one. A cursory glance at 
the earliest definitions of being from the ancient philosophers, through the 
scholastics to Descartes and Kant as that which exist, it would be discovered 
that their concept of being has remained abstract and unsubstantiated. 
Although they have answered the question of what is being, they are yet to 
answer the question of what being is substantively. During the development 
of the concept of being by African philosophers, being assumes a more 
operative concept; it became something concrete and substantive. This 
notwithstanding, the concept of being through the ages has remained that 
which is. No matter how much light future thinkers may shed on this concept, 
it would still remain that which is.  
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